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Introduction 
In philosophy of religion, omniscience continues to be a lively and controversial 
topic. While some debates have come and gone, the topic of divine foreknowledge 
continues to be wrestled over by very capable scholars. The rise of Open Theism in 
the past twenty years has caused many people to question their assumptions about 
divine foreknowledge. One formidable defender of Open Theism is William 
Hasker, who has written several books and many articles on the subject. In 2012, 
he wrote an essay proposing a new theodicy for natural evil. He attempted to show 
that Open Theism better accounts for natural evil than Molinism or Augustinianism. 
In this essay, I will show why Hasker’s theodicy can also be utilized by the 
Molinist, and why Open Theism’s denial of divine foreknowledge turns God into a 
reckless risk-taker. I will begin by explaining his terminology; then I will 
summarize his natural order theodicy; subsequently, I will detail the implications 
of his theodicy and argue that Molinism is the preferable position. 
Preliminaries 
To understand William Hasker’s theodicy, we must understand the definitions and 
concepts he introduces at the beginning of the essay. First, he defines the term 
“theodicy” as 
 
a response to an argument from evil, an argument that claims that in view 
of some evil that exists in this world it is incoherent or unreasonable to 
believe in the existence of the theistic God. A theodicy replies to such an 
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argument by giving a justifying reason for the existence of the evil in 
question; a reason such that, if it indeed obtains, the permission of the evil 
by God is morally justifiable and does not constitute a reason to 
disbelieve in God's existence or his goodness (Hasker 2012, 281-282). 
 
Subsequently, he sets forth two categories of theodicies: general-policy theodicies 
and specific-benefit theodicies. General-policy theodicies attempt to explain evil by 
proposing some overarching plan that God has for the universe. An example of this 
would be the free will theodicy, in which God allows moral evil to occur because 
intervening would violate someone’s free will. By contrast, specific-benefit 
theodicies attempt to give reasons for God allowing specific events in history to 
occur. For instance, if someone were to ask why God allowed his or her mother to 
go through cancer and suffer a painful death, the specific-benefit theodicist would 
attempt to give specific goods produced or evils averted that resulted from God 
allowing this person’s mother to die. 
 Following this delineation, Hasker categorizes two different models of 
divine providence under the terms risk-free and risk-taking. By the term risk-free, 
Hasker means that God knows the consequences of his own choices and the 
decisions of his creation. He places Molinism and Augustinianism in this category, 
as both views support divine foreknowledge. In both views, God knows the 
decisions that people will make, and how those decisions will impact the future. 
The difference between the two positions is that Molinism views God’s middle 
knowledge as being acquired before His divine creative decree; Augustinianism 
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views God as either lacking middle knowledge or acquiring middle knowledge after 
His divine creative decree. In the second Augustinian option, God acquires middle 
knowledge by choosing what people would do when placed in certain 
circumstances. Yet in both Augustinian options, God remains the causal power 
behind every event in nature.  
By the term risk-taking, Hasker means that God does not know the far-
reaching consequences of his actions or the actions of his creation. Under this 
category Hasker puts Open Theism and simple foreknowledge. In Open Theism, 
God does not know the future, and therefore makes decisions based on probabilities 
and the present conditions; whatever has the greatest probability of resulting in a 
good action or effect, God chooses to help bring it about.1 In simple foreknowledge, 
God does know the future, but he cannot affect it in any meaningful way. The 
unchanging nature of the future results from God’s infallible belief: if God were to 
know something prior to its occurrence, and an action or event occurs which 
contradicts God’s foreknowledge, then He would hold a false belief. Since the 
standard definition of omniscience holds that God knows all true propositions, His 
beliefs cannot be false, and thus God cannot change the future. The implications of 
                                                     
 1. The consensus among Open Theists is that God does not have knowledge of the future 
because he created humans with libertarian freedom. Open Theists argue that divine foreknowledge 
is logically incompatible with libertarian freedom; since libertarian freedom is required for moral 
responsibility and genuinely loving relationships, God creates humans with this freedom so that he 
can have relationship with his creation. Depending upon the person’s defense of Open Theism, God 
either 1) cannot have knowledge of the future because the future is unknowable, or 2) the future is 
knowable, but God restricts his knowledge out of love for humanity. 
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simple foreknowledge are clear: if God created a world, and upon creating the 
world he foreknew that a man would be brutally murdered, He could not prevent 
that murder due to His own nature. In this way God can be called “risk-taking”; he 
created a world knowing that evil could potentially occur that He could not stop.2 
 Drawing from these categories, Hasker argues that certain models of 
providence can only use certain types of theodicies. In the case of risk-taking 
models of providence, a general-policy theodicy is the only option available. This 
makes sense, as the Open Theist would never be able to give specific goods 
produced or evils averted, since God does not know what will happen in the future. 
Hasker also argues that risk-free models of providence can only use specific-benefit 
theodicies. Hasker claims that 
 
the God of Molinism or Augustinianism has decided to permit the evil in 
question in the light of full knowledge of the evil itself and its specific 
consequences. It seems, then, most implausible that God would permit the 
evil simply on the basis of general policies, while ignoring the particulars 
surrounding the occurrence of the evil and its consequences (284). 
 
Using his terminology, Hasker’s theodicy may be described as a general-policy 
theodicy combatting the claim that natural evil disproves the existence of God. 
Hasker’s Natural Order Theodicy 
                                                     
 2. This is the analysis given by Hasker and other Open Theists. David Hunt, who is a 
proponent of simple foreknowledge, has argued against this conclusion. See his article “Divine 
Providence and Simple Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy 10, no. 3 (June 1993): 396-416. 
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Now that the groundwork has been laid, Hasker’s actual argument can be examined. 
He begins by describing five good structural features of a world. He says that “if it 
is good that a world should exist with these structural features, it is also justifiable 
that the natural evils should be allowed to exist; they are, so to speak, the price of 
admission for the existence of such a world” (288). First, he claims that it is good 
that there should be a world. The term “world” here means “the sum total of 
concrete things that exist, other than God if there is a God” (ibid.). This first 
assertion gives minimal value to existence itself and denies the nihilistic claim that 
existence has no value. Second, he claims that it is good that there should be a 
complex, multi-leveled natural world. By this, he means that many different entities 
and kinds of entities exist, each with varying levels of internal complexity and 
causal powers, and these entities act within their own causal powers, without 
interference from a higher power. This great variety would allow for the third good: 
that a world contains beings that are sentient and rational. Hasker thinks that a good 
world should be appreciated by its occupants: “…if the world is good, then it is 
desirable that it be found to be so by its inhabitants, and surely their appreciation 
of it will require extensive sensory capacities as well as reason, which is needed to 
enable the evaluation” (290). 
 Fourth, Hasker believes it is good that the creatures in the world should 
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. If a being has inherent causal capabilities, 
is sentient, and is rational, then Hasker believes it should have some form of 
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personal autonomy. Hasker thinks that “to the extent that this is done, the intrinsic 
worth of the being is more clearly exhibited than it would be were this degree of 
independence not allowed” (ibid.). Fifth, Hasker thinks that “it is good that there 
should be an evolving world, a world in which the universe as a whole as well as 
its component systems develop from within, utilizing their inherent powers and 
potentialities” (291). While he does not explicitly explain why an evolving world 
would be good, he quotes Henry Ward Beecher to get his point across: 
 
If single acts would evince design, how much more a vast universe, that by 
inherent laws gradually built itself and then created its own plants and 
animals, a universe so adjusted that it left by the way the poorest things, and 
steadily wrought toward more complex, ingenious, and beautiful results! 
Who designed this mighty machine, created matter, gave it its laws, and 
impressed upon it that tendency which has brought forth almost infinite 
results on the globe, and wrought them into a perfect system? Design by 
wholesale is grander than design by retail (Beecher 1885, 114). 
 
 Once he establishes these five structural features, Hasker attempts to 
explain why natural evil must occur in a natural world. He begins with volcanic 
eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis, which all originate from plate tectonics. 
While these catastrophes do produce massive amounts of destruction, the shifting 
of tectonic plates creates effects that are necessary for life on earth. These effects 
include the strong magnetic fields surrounding the earth, and the key transitional 
points within the evolutionary process that result from volcanic eruptions.  
Additionally, Hasker discusses hurricanes, tornadoes, and drought, which 
are caused by changes in our natural weather system. In response, he says that these 
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events are natural parts of our ordinary weather cycle. It does not matter if they are 
detrimental to our overall way of life; nature is indifferent to our wants and desires 
and does not adapt to our needs. If it did so, then these would not be natural laws.  
Finally, Hasker tackles the general pain and suffering that animals and 
humans experience. He responds by concluding that pain and suffering are natural 
parts of the evolutionary process and help us survive. Death and pain are necessary 
for evolution to occur: 
 
Admittedly, great pain is sometimes suffered when the harm is already 
beyond the point where anything can be done about it. But to insist that pain 
ought to be present only when it is possible for the harm it signals to be 
alleviated is to make a demand that surpasses the engineering limitations of 
the organism (Hasker, 295). 
 
 While answering questions about different kinds of natural evil, Hasker also 
attempts to answer questions about the world as a whole. As an example, a skeptic 
might ask why God could not make a better natural system than this one; in this 
proposed system, pleasure would outnumber pain and give us a better overall 
existence. Hasker gives two different responses. He first claims that we cannot 
compare the real world to alternative worlds with different natural laws because we 
don’t know what those worlds would be like. The questioner can ask if God could 
do better, but we don’t really know what better natural laws would look like.  
Secondly, due to fine-tuning, it seems unlikely that a world that had 
different natural laws could exist. Fine-tuning shows us that many physical 
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conditions must occur within an extremely small range of variation; if these values 
changed a miniscule amount, the universe would not be able to exist. Based off this 
fact, the idea that a world could contain vastly different natural laws seems 
extremely unlikely.3 
With his initial claims being rebutted, the objector may try to shift the blame 
onto God for the seeming cruelty of nature: 
 
But if nature can be neither kind nor cruel, should we conclude that cruelty 
is rather to be attributed to the one who planned and created such a system? 
Not unless, reversing the judgments we have made up to this point, we are 
prepared to say that the existence of the world is a bad thing overall—that 
it would be better that nothing at all should exist (or nothing other than God) 
than that such a world as this one should be (296). 
 
Because many people are not nihilist, few would say that it would be better that 
nothing should exist rather than something; thus, this objection seems to fall flat. 
To conclude the argument, Hasker summarizes his Natural Order Theodicy in 
syllogistic form: 
1. The actual universe is a complex, multi‐leveled natural world, 
containing creatures that are sentient as well as some that are 
intelligent. The world has developed to its present state through a 
complex evolutionary process, and enjoys a considerable amount of 
autonomy in its functioning. 
2. The universe so constituted makes possible a large amount of good, 
both in the order and beauty of the physical universe and in the 
development and flourishing of a myriad of living creatures. It also 
unavoidably contains a great deal of suffering and death. 
                                                     
 3. One example of fine-tuning would be gravitational forces. If these forces were increased 
or decreased by even the most miniscule amount, gravity could either crush us or cause us to float 
off the surface of the earth. There are over 100 different examples of fine-tuning widely recognized 
by scientists today, which makes this response particularly compelling. 
Justice 9 
 
Quaerens Deum   Spring 2016   Volume 2   Issue 1 
3. There is no good reason for us to suppose that some alternative order 
of nature, capable of being created by an all‐powerful God, would 
surpass the present universe in its potentiality for good or in its 
balance of good versus evil. 
4. In virtue of 1–3, it is good that God has created this universe; there 
is no basis for holding God morally at fault for doing so, or for 
supposing that a perfectly good Creator would have acted 
differently (298). 
Implications of Hasker’s Theodicy 
Using his theodicy as a foundation for a further point, Hasker asks an important 
question: due to the non-moral nature of evolution, who is responsible for the 
gruesome circumstances we find in nature? He points out a National Geographic 
documentary, where a pack of wolves forms a blockade around a rival pack’s den 
and starves the young cubs to death. How is this kind of brutal behavior allowed to 
occur? For Hasker, Molinism and Augustinianism provide an insufficient answer: 
 
For both Augustinians and Molinists, the answer is entirely clear: this 
particular sequence of events, like every other, is the consequence of God's 
intentional, specific, and minutely detailed choice of a world to make actual 
… God, then, specifically planned and intended the spider's capture of the 
moth, the blockade and starvation of the wolf cubs, and many, many other 
such ‘trivial details’. Nothing could be clearer than this, however chilling 
the consequences as we contemplate the fate of the wolf cubs (300, original 
emphasis). 
 
Conversely, the God of Open Theism seems to escape the scenario where he intends 
the suffering of his creation: 
 
God has planned and brought into being the universe with all of its inherent 
laws and structure, and has permitted the natural course of events to 
proceed, but God has not specifically ‘planned, ordered, provided for, and 
ensured’ each and every event that takes place, including the capture of the 
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moth, the starvation of the wolf cubs, and a great many even more unsavory 
events that disfigure human history. God, indeed, is deeply grieved at many 
of these events, yet in his gracious wisdom he grants to the creation the 
degree of autonomy needed to act according to its own nature, and refrains 
from frequent, intrusive intervention into the course of earthly events (ibid., 
original emphasis). 
 
Because God does not know the future, he cannot intend the consequences of his 
actions, which in this case would entail the starvation of young wolf cubs. 
Therefore, Hasker thinks that Open Theism provides a better fit for his Natural 
Order Theodicy, and thus has the advantage over Molinism and Augustinianism.  
While I do believe that Hasker’s critique proves difficult for 
Augustinianism, I disagree with Hasker’s evaluation of Molinism. Instead, I will 
argue that Molinism provides a better answer to the problem of natural evil and 
gives real substance to the Natural Order Theodicy. 
Which Position Best Handles the Problem of Natural Evil? 
To begin, Hasker’s insistence that Molinism and Augustinianism cannot use 
general-policy theodicies seems misguided. To recall, Hasker thinks that the 
Molinist or Augustinian God could not permit evil based on general policies and 
“ignore the particulars” (284) surrounding an evil event. However, the Molinist or 
the Augustinian never says that God would “ignore the particulars”; he merely 
thinks that God might have a general principle that, in full view of the specific 
circumstances surrounding a situation, would still justify God permitting that evil. 
Nothing inherent in Molinism or Augustinianism contradicts this idea. 
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Furthermore, Hasker never gives evidence as to why God’s use of general policies 
seems “implausible”; he just states his opinion and moves on. Based on this lack of 
support, the Molinist should be perfectly justified in using general-policy theodicies 
to defend God’s permission of an evil event. Kenneth Perszyk even proposes how 
God might use middle knowledge when deciding between general strategies: 
 
By his middle knowledge, he sees which strategies are and aren't open to 
him … He sees what would result on the condition that he pursue each 
strategy … He sees what would result from various combinations of natural 
laws, or from different sets of laws of varying complexity; he sees which 
ones would allow for the emergence of significant finite free agency, and 
which would not. He compares the results and picks one or more of them. 
Far from middle knowledge being incompatible with following general 
strategies, it's arguable that it gives the notion real substance (Perszyk 1998, 
171). 
 
 At this point it might be beneficial to clarify middle knowledge and its 
impact on human freedom. While this paper focuses primarily on Open Theism, 
Molinism, and natural evil, the laws of nature can impact the circumstances which 
humans find themselves in, thereby affecting God’s middle knowledge. When a 
Molinist mentions middle knowledge, he or she is referring to God’s knowledge of 
what person P would choose to do in circumstances C. William Lane Craig explains 
this concept using Peter’s denial of Jesus as an illustration: 
 
By his natural knowledge God knew in the first [logical] moment all the 
possible things that Peter could do if placed in such circumstances. But now 
in this second [logical] moment he knows what Peter would in fact freely 
choose to do under such circumstances. This is not because Peter would be 
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causally determined by the circumstances to act in this way. No, Peter is 
entirely free, and under the same circumstances he could choose to act in 
another way … if it is true that Peter would sin if placed in certain 
circumstances, it follows that even though a world with identical 
circumstances in which Peter does not sin is [logically] possible, 
nevertheless it is not within God’s power to create that world (Craig 2000, 
130). 
 
God could not create the logically possible world where Peter did not sin 
because it was not feasible. Feasibility denotes whether a world could be actualized 
based upon a person’s free choice; if someone would not choose to perform an 
action given certain circumstances, then the possible world containing that action 
is not feasible. Under this definition of feasibility, the future free choices of persons 
are not causally determined by the circumstances; the circumstances themselves are 
causally irrelevant to the decision of the person. This means that God’s knowledge 
of these circumstances, called counterfactuals, is contingently true: 
  
[person] S could freely decide to refrain from [action] a in [circumstance] 
C, so that different counterfactuals could be true and be known by God than 
those that are. Hence, although it is essential to God that He have middle 
knowledge, it is not essential to Him to have middle knowledge of those 
particular propositions which He does in fact know (Craig 1991, 238). 
 
The contingent truth of counterfactuals also provides a rebuttal to theological 
fatalism. While God does know via middle knowledge what we would do when 
placed in certain circumstances, this knowledge does not constrain our freedom in 
any way. If we were to act in a way that contradicted God’s knowledge, then He 
would simply know that we would act that way instead of what He knows now 
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(Craig 2000, 66-67). On the Molinist scheme, what we choose to do determines 
God’s middle knowledge, and then God’s middle knowledge determines what 
feasible worlds are available for God to make actual. 
Moving to the Natural Order Theodicy itself, no part of the argument seems 
to prohibit the Molinist from adopting it and using it for her position. Indeed, 
premise 3 seems to gain even greater support on the Molinist scheme, as it can be 
argued that the actual world is the best feasible world.4 God, by his middle 
knowledge, would ensure that the actual world’s laws of nature provide the best 
balance of good versus evil. Of course, this “best balance” would still allow for the 
free will of human beings, meaning that the only feasible option for God in some 
situations would be to allow evils to be committed. However, one of the good 
structural features of a world discussed previously was personal autonomy, and it 
seems that sacrificing libertarian free will is not a viable option for someone who 
wants to uphold the idea of moral responsibility. Consequently, if this notion of 
“best balance” is in fact the case, then premise 3 is much better supported on the 
Molinist scheme.  
                                                     
 4. This should not be confused with the best possible world, as this is a separate notion. A 
best possible world is the best logically possible world; a best feasible world is the best world God 
is capable of actualizing considering the free choices of human beings. In a series of lectures at 
Aalborg University on the Problem of Evil, William Lane Craig gives a good distinction between 
these two ideas.. A video of these lectures may be found at www.reasonablefaith.org/media/the-
problem-of-suffering-and-evil-aalborg-university.  
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Additionally, the defenses which Hasker uses to rebut potential objections 
could be adopted by the Molinist. The Molinist could insist that natural events 
which cause destruction of human and animal life are necessary for the 
improvement and progression of life on earth. Additionally, the Molinist could 
argue that logically possible worlds with different sets of natural laws were not 
feasible for God, thereby bolstering Hasker’s fine-tuning argument. The only 
defense that would not work is Hasker’s denial of foreknowledge, which directly 
contradicts the Molinist’s acceptance of divine foreknowledge. 
 Finally, we move to Hasker’s primary critique of Molinism. Throughout his 
essay, Hasker particularly emphasizes the idea of the Molinist God intending evil 
events to occur. He thinks that Open Theism removes any hint of God’s intentions 
being involved with evil, and thus he escapes criticism. Ironically, it seems that 
Molinism actually gives the intention/permission distinction real meaning, and that 
Open Theism leaves God with no intention or permission. With deterministic 
positions like Augustinianism, it becomes exceedingly difficult to argue that God 
does not intend each occurrence of evil, as on this view God “ordains” all things to 
occur.  
In the Molinist scheme, due to the acceptance of libertarian free will, the 
distinction between intention and permission may still be intact. The Molinist can 
argue that 
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God's general concurrence is intrinsically neutral or indifferent; it's rendered 
inefficacious (in the case of an evil effect) by the free secondary cause. At 
the time of action, Molinists will insist that it's really possible for us to 
refrain (freely) from the evil action, even though it's not possible for God 
that we do otherwise than he foreknew (Perszyk, 169). 
 
If this neutral support does allow for libertarian free will, then God can truly be said 
to not intend evil, but simply permit evil to occur. Thus, if a Molinist can show that 
the intention/permission distinction holds in moral evil, then this same distinction 
should hold in cases of natural evil as well. The Molinist could argue that some 
natural evils are the result of free secondary causes. This way, God could permit 
these secondary causes to run their course due to a general strategy or specific 
benefit resulting from the event.   
In the Open Theist scheme, however, God seems to lack both intention and 
permission of evil: 
  
Being able to say that God permits evil implies that God could have 
prevented it. Being able to prevent evil, in turn, implies that one had 
sufficient knowledge about it and power to prevent it. If God's omniscience 
doesn't (or can't) include foreknowledge of free human actions, there may 
be a sense in which God cannot even be said to permit our evil free actions 
(Perszyk, 170). 
  
If God does not intend or permit evil events, it seems that God is just an ignorant 
deity who waits for bad things to happen, and then rushes in to clean up the 
aftermath. 
A Fatal Dilemma for Open Theism 
Justice 16 
 
Quaerens Deum   Spring 2016   Volume 2   Issue 1 
From these previous critiques of Hasker, it seems that Molinism is, at the very least, 
on the same playing field as Open Theism when responding to the problem of 
natural evil. Additionally, Perszyk provides what may be a decisive point in favor 
of Molinism. He suggests that Open Theism is in a fatal dilemma in relation to God 
and his probability-based decision making.5  
As a test case, imagine the God of Open Theism. He has perfect knowledge 
of the past and present, but can only know what would probably happen in the 
future. Hasker argues that God cannot know the future because it is logically 
impossible for anyone, including God, to know the future. Suppose God thought it 
was highly likely, due to present conditions and His probability calculations, that a 
devastating hurricane would strike the coast of Florida in the near future. If God 
permitted that hurricane to occur or brought about the circumstances in which that 
hurricane would likely occur, then Open Theism would be more vulnerable to 
Hasker’s own critiques of Molinism.6 Because humans can predict weather patterns 
with good accuracy, even though we are finite creatures, God could have known 
with confidence that this hurricane would occur, especially when He has perfect 
knowledge of the past and present. In this case it seems that God at least permitted, 
if not intended, the evil to occur, which Hasker wants to avoid. Moreover, suppose 
                                                     
5. My argument is an adaptation of Perszyk’s argument in “Molinism and Theodicy,” 
174-175. In his article, he addresses moral evil; I’ve used his core critique but substituted in an 
example of natural evil. 
6. Even though God’s permission of evil seems questionable on the Open Theist model, I 
will give Hasker the benefit of the doubt here. 
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the probabilities were lower than 50 percent, but still “non-negligible,” to use 
Perszyk’s term (174). Even then, God might still be blameworthy for taking an 
unnecessary risk, considering the likelihood of the hurricane.  
To avoid his own critiques of Molinism, Hasker would have to decrease, if 
not entirely eliminate, God’s ability to make probability calculations. If God did 
not know as much about the future, then Hasker could avoid the charge of God 
intending evil. However, the less God knows about the future, the more it looks like 
God is blindly making decisions. If God is choosing to act without the proper 
information, then God seems increasingly reckless and our confidence in His 
providence will dwindle away. It seems then that Hasker has two choices: either 
accept that his conception of God is closer to the Molinist conception than he would 
like to admit and accordingly provide a clarified concept of the intention/permission 
distinction, or accept that God recklessly risks the well-being of humanity for what 
He thinks is a better future. If he accepts the first option, then he must show how 
God can accurately be described as “permitting” evils if He does not have divine 
foreknowledge. If he accepts the second option, then the God of Open Theism is 
not worthy of worship. 
At this point, Hasker might feel cheated by my argument. He might think 
that I have glossed over the controversy surrounding Molinism; this is 
understandable, considering Hasker has been a well-known advocate of the 
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“grounding” objection to Molinism.7 I think he would be partially right, in that a 
discussion of the objections to Molinism goes beyond the scope of this paper. Yet 
I think this response would also miss the point of my argument. The thrust of my 
critique has been the following: assuming Open Theism and Molinism have no fatal 
flaws in their understanding of divine foreknowledge or providence, which position 
provides the best response to the problem of evil? Given that assumption, I think 
Hasker must face the dilemma I explained above. Of course, he could argue that 
counterfactuals of freedom are ungrounded, and consequently that Molinism is 
false; nevertheless, this would do nothing to dismiss the dilemma I presented above. 
Thus, given the assumption that neither position is fatally flawed, I think my 
conclusion still stands: Molinism provides a better response to the problem of 
natural evil. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I began by expounding William Hasker’s Natural Order Theodicy, 
starting with his definition and categories of both theodicies and models of 
providence. I then moved on to Hasker’s actual argument, explaining how a 
structurally good world can give God justification for allowing natural evil to occur. 
After dealing with potential objections and presenting Hasker’s critique of 
                                                     
 7. The “grounding” objection is the argument that counterfactuals of freedom do not have 
any ground which causes them to be true. For Hasker’s original formulation of this argument, see 
“A Refutation of Middle Knowledge,” Noûs 20, no. 4 (December 1986): 545-557. For the revised 
version of the argument, see “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited,” Faith and Philosophy 
12, no. 2 (April 1995): 223-236. 
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Molinism, I proceeded to show that Molinism readily adopts Hasker’s argument 
and provides it with further support. Subsequently, I showed that Open Theism has 
real problems in its conception of divine foreknowledge while simultaneously 
arguing for Molinism’s substantive intention/permission distinction. In the end, it 
seems that the God of Open Theism is a reckless risk-taker, while the God of 
Molinism is sovereign, powerful, and untamed. 
 Yet this should not be the end of the discussion; more nuance is needed in 
the Molinist response to natural evil that reaches beyond the scope of this essay. 
Should the Molinist promote a “best feasible world” argument? Can one prove that 
there are free secondary causes in nature? If so, how similar are they to freedom 
found in human agents? These questions could have a serious impact on discussions 
of the problem of evil, and deserve to be answered. Hasker presumptuously 
sounded the death knell on Molinist responses to the problem of evil; in reality, 
there is much fruitful discussion yet to come. 
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